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Forecasting Spanish Elections 
 
  The behavior of the individual Spanish voter has come to be rather well-understood, 
thanks to a growing research literature.  However, no models have appeared to explain, or to 
forecast, national election outcomes.   The presence of this research gap contrasts sharply with 
the extensive election forecasting work done on other leading Western democracies.  Here we fill 
this gap.  The model, developed from core political economy theory, is parsimonious but 
statistically robust.  Further, it promises considerable prediction accuracy of Spanish general 
election outcomes, six months before the contest actually occurs.    After presenting the model, 

























Over the last twenty years, statistical models to forecast election results have received 
considerable attention from political scientists [for recent reviews, see Lewis-Beck (2005) and 
Lewis-Beck and Tien (2011)]. Most published work has focused on the United States, although 
more is coming out on the leading Western European democracies, such as France, Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom [See the contemporary collection of papers on European election 
forecasting, Jérôme and Lewis-Beck (2010)]. Serious forecasting models are also appearing for 
the newer European democracies, such as Portugal (Magalhães and Aguiar-Conraria, 2009) and 
Hungary (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009). It is high time Spain joins this dynamic literature. 
  That no election forecasting model has been proposed for Spain may seem odd. After all, 
voting behavior research in Spain has burgeoned, including the part that treats a central aspect of 
most  election  forecasting  models:  the  role  of  the  economy.  Studies  estimating  functions  for 
aggregate  incumbent  vote  shares  have  shown  them  to  be  negatively  affected  by  trends  in 
unemployment and inflation (Bosch and Riba 2005). Similarly, in studies using individual-level 
data, Spain emerges as a case where individual voting decisions for or against the incumbent 
seem to be influenced by the perceived state of the economy (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1986; 
Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2010), and by objective economic indicators (Fraile and Lewis-Beck 
2011). Furthermore, this relationship that seems to be particularly strong when looked at in 
comparative terms (Lewis-Beck 1988; van der Brug, Van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007; Duch and 
Stevenson 2008).  
  And yet, a deeper look into the Spanish voting behavior literature reveals a resilient 
uneasiness with the classic reward-punishment view (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981) about the role of 
the economy in elections. As early as 1986, McDonough, Barnes and López Pina (1986, 446-
447) puzzled over the “widespread popularity” of the Socialist (PSOE) government in spite of 4 
 
 
the highest levels of unemployment in Western Europe. Hamann (2000, 1043) was similarly 
struck by PSOE’s victories in 1986, 1989, and 1993, ultimately suggesting that “no clear pattern 
exists between vote choice for the governing Socialist party and macroeconomic conditions.” 
With time, several striking findings have feed this perspective. Some have found positive (rather 
than  negative)  effects  of  unemployment  rates  on  aggregate  levels  of  government  popularity 
(Amor  Bravo  1987;  Mancha  Navarro  1993).  Also,  there  is  the  suggestion  that  the  role  of 
unemployment and inflation in shaping incumbent support in Spain has shifted through time, 
with inflation becoming more important since the 1990s (Bosch and Riba 2005). Still others have 
focused on the role of ideology and other enduring political predispositions in voting decisions, 
seeing them as trumping the effects of economic perceptions (Sáez Lozano and Jaime Castillo 
2001), or even as mediating or shaping those very perceptions (Maravall and Przeworski 1999; 
Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2005; Sáez Lozano, Jaime Castillo and Danalache 2006). Yet others 
have  found  that  the  negative  effect  of  unemployment  on  the  PSOE  electoral  vote  was 
neutralized, even reversed, both by the welfare policies of PSOE, and by voters’ mistrust of the 
opposition’s (the Partido Popular) stance on social policy (Maravall and Fraile 2001; Fraile 
2005). 
  Although we can only speculate, it seems possible that the controversy generated by these 
findings, together with the massive 1982 electoral earthquake (the near eradication of the UCD, 
the  incumbent),  may  have  deterred  election  scholars  from  designing  a  forecasting  model. 
However, we have decided to take up that task, approaching the problem in a straightforward 
way. On the one hand, we examine the “core political economy” model of forecasting, making 
electoral  support  of  the  incumbent  party  a  function  of  political  and  economic  performance 
[About this conceptual framework, see especially Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Bélanger (2004).]. 5 
 
 
On the other hand, we take stock of theoretical findings on both Spanish elections in particular 
and European elections generally, in an attempt to develop the model.  
To be sure, election forecasting is never tantamount to theory-testing. Its aggregate level 
focus on prediction, coupled with the inevitably small number of observations (actual electoral 
outcomes) and the implied necessary parsimony of explanation, prevent forecasting models from 
being unambiguous validations of electoral behavior hypotheses. Still, to be of greater value than 
a mere parlor-game, forecasting models need to be theory-driven, so setting them apart from 
other forecasting approaches, such as opinion polls or political markets. As Lewis-Beck and Tien 
(2000, 98) observed: “Forecasting requires more than curve fitting.  It wants good theory.”  With 
theory  as  a  guide,  we  hope  to  construct  a  useful  empirical  forecasting  model  of  Spanish 
elections.  Below, we estimate and evaluate a limited set of models, interacting with theory and 
regression diagnostics, to arrive at a preferred specification.  As a final exercise, we apply this 
model to forecasting the 2012 Spanish election. 
 
An Initial Model 
 
The  core  political  economy  equation  behind  most  election  forecasting  models  is  the 
following (see Lewis-Beck and Tien, 2011): 
 
  Incumbent Vote = f (Government Popularity, Economic Performance) 
 
The  incumbent’s  vote  share  is  held  to  be  a  function  of  general  government  performance, 
indicated by a popularity measure, and general economic performance, indicated by a measure of 
the macroeconomy.  Further, these variables are measured at the national level, typically in short 6 
 
 
time series across the post-World War II period [For a founding, global treatment of these issues, 
see Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992)]. Applying these constraints to the Spanish case, we first find 
that government popularity, measured in a consistent fashion, is not available until the 1990s. 
The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), the leading source of national survey data in 
Spain, only began collecting government approval data in October 1993, and then not on a 
monthly  basis.    Therefore,  between  October  1993  and  July  2009,  just  65  observations  are 
available.  If this popularity measure were used, no more than four general elections could be 
covered, an obviously insufficient number.   
Fortunately, there is a popularity proxy variable available from the CIS surveys since 
June 1979: a general evaluation of the “political situation”. On an almost monthly basis, the CIS 
“barometer” has posed the following question to respondents: 
 
“And talking about the general political situation in Spain, how would you describe it? 
Very good, good, so-so, bad, or very bad?” 
 
 
The question is not deliberately aimed at government performance. However, it is to be expected 
that government performance would greatly influence the “general political situation,” and so 
may serve as a useful proxy. In fact, the aggregate level correlation between this general political 
situation  variable  (percentage  who  answered  “very  good”  or  “good”)  and  the  government 
approval variable (also a percentage) is quite strong, at r = .81 (based on the 65 observations 
from 1993 to 2009).  Hence, we employ this general political situation variable as a workable 
proxy for government popularity.
1  
                                                        
1 We are extremely grateful to Belén Barreiro for making these data available to us. 7 
 
 
What is the preferred macroeconomic indicator?  There is no consensus on one “best” 
macroeconomic  variable  (see  the  discussion  in  Lewis-Beck,  2005).  Nannestad  and  Paldam 
(1994) have pointed to the “big two” of unemployment and inflation, although others point to the 
wide-spread use of growth and income (Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1992). In a study of the other 
Iberian case - Portugal - the economic growth rate was used, given the lack of reliable data on 
unemployment for part of the relevant period (Magalhães and Aguiar-Conraria 2009). However, 
in the case of Spain, such data are available throughout the entire series and can be used. Our 
expectation  is  that  unemployment,  as  well  as  inflation,  should  be  negatively  related  with 
incumbent vote share. Using the available data on the political situation, unemployment and 
inflation to devise a forecast model of the incumbent give us eight observations: on all legislative 
elections, 1982 - 2008.  
We can further increase our sample size by including the other “national” election that 
takes place in Spain and is contested on a partisan basis: the elections to the European Parliament 
in  1987,  1989,  1994,  1999,  2004  and  2009.  The  parties  that  compete  in  these  elections  are 
roughly the same that compete in legislative elections, and the “incumbent party” and its vote 
share remain clearly identifiable concepts. This “pooling” strategy, combining legislative and 
European elections, has been successfully pursed in the examination of election outcomes in 
other European counties (e.g., see the French example in Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2000).  The 
validity of such a pool rests on the notion that the forces acting on European Parliament voters 
are essentially the same ones operating on legislative election voters (see Franklin and van der 
Eijk, 1996).  
It would be wrong, though, to assume that such European elections work in the exact 
same way as legislative elections. European elections have been famously described as “second-8 
 
 
order” elections, characterized, first, by lower levels of turnout.  Also, they are characterized by 
systematic losses for the governing parties, given voters’ higher incentives to vote sincerely and 
to punish governments without actually changing the governments (Reif and Schmitt 1980).
2 
Thus, although the incumbent vote share can be predicted both for the legislative and European 
elections, our expectation is that the latter are marked by a dependable loss for the incumbent. In 
other words, we expect a negative sign on the coefficient associated with a “European election” 
dummy,  comparable  to  that  obtained  in  a  relevant  forecast  model  of  the  Italian  elections 
(Bellucci 2010). 
The vote function to be estimated reads as follows: 
     (1) 
where VOTE is the proportion of the valid vote obtained by the incumbent party at each election, 
European is a dummy variable with value 1 in the case of European Parliament elections and 0 
otherwise, Inflation is the percentage rate of inflation, Unemployment is the percentage rate of 
unemployment and PolSit is the percentage of individuals in the CIS surveys that rated the 
political situation as “good” or “very good”. Inflation, Unemployment and PolSit are measured 
with a 6-month lag in relation to the month of the election.
3 
The lag structure merits special attention.  A six-month lag permits a true forecast, well in 
advance of the election itself. Further, there is evidence that a six-month lag optimizes prediction 
accuracy.  Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992, 123), in their experiments on the United States and 
France, found that the six-month offered more precision than alternatives.  They concluded this 
was due, in part, to the fact that the forecasts were made “before the battle heats up.”  (Lewis-
                                                        
2 The exception to this pattern is provided by European elections that take place very early in the 
legislative election cycle, where “honeymoon effects” tend to prevail. 
3 Because of this lag structure, we excluded from the analysis the European election of 2004, which took 
place only three months after the 2004 legislative election that led to a change in the incumbent party, 
from the PP to PSOE. 9 
 
 
Beck and Rice, 1992, 123).  More recently, Whiteley and colleagues (2010), commenting on 
their current election forecasting model for the United Kingdom, also found that the six-month 
lag was optimal. In our case, the fit of the model was also maximized with this lag structure. 
These data, along with measures on the other variables, are presented in the Appendix.   
 
 
Table 1:  Core Political Economy Election Forecast Model for Spain.  
European election  -.047 
  (.044) 
Inflation (t-6 months)  -.018** 
  (.006) 
Unemployment (t-6 months)  .011 
  (.007) 
PolSit (t-6 months)  .005* 
  (.003) 
Constant  .222 
  (.131) 
R2  .68 
Adjusted R2  .52 
SEE  .068 
N  13 
Significance: *** .01, ** .05 and * .10; one-tailed test 
 
The equation, as estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS), is presented in Table 1.  
These estimates do support this expression of the core political economy model, at least to some 
extent. Of the four independent variables, three have the expected signs: the model predicts an 
incumbent party will experience losses in European elections, have lower electoral support under 
higher  levels  of  inflation,  and  greater  electoral  support  when  the  political  situation  is  more 
positive. Two of those three coefficients have p-values smaller than .10, and one smaller than 
.05. However, the coefficient for unemployment has the opposite sign to initial expectations 10 
 
 
(positive rather than negative) and lacks statistical significance at conventional levels.  Further, 
the overall fit of the model is not particularly good, with R-squared = .68.  Additionally, the 
standard error of the estimate (SEE =.07), suggests that, for a typical future election, a forecast 
made from this model will be off by seven percentage points, not a particularly high level of 
precision. All things considered, it is worth examining how the model might be revised. 
 
Revised Models 
What to make of these first results in terms of possible refinements? A first approach 
would  be  to  assume  that  something  like  Hibbs’s  (1977)  partisan  theory  of  macroeconomic 
policy, at least in what concerns the electoral effects of unemployment. Hibbs’s argument is that 
parties are evaluated on the basis of economic objectives that have high priority for them, and 
seen as such by voters. Supposing left-wing parties are interested in reducing unemployment, 
changes  in  unemployment  should  affect  their  electoral  performance  and  not  the  electoral 
performance of a right-wing incumbent. In other words, the reason we are not seeing an effect on 
unemployment here with model 1 is because such an effect – a negative one – might only exist 
for the case of PSOE as an incumbent. 
A  second  approach  would  be  to  assume  that  policy-oriented  voting  (rather  than 
incumbency-oriented) voting takes place in Spain. According to Kiewiet (1983), a heightened 
concern with unemployment will lead voters to support those parties that place such concern 
above  others.  In  other  words,  increasing  unemployment  is  not  likely  to  hurt  left-wing 
incumbents. Instead, given the parties different reputations, it is likely to benefit left-wing parties 
and  hurt  right-wing  parties,  regardless  of  which  party  might  be  the  incumbent.  In  a  model 
capturing such a phenomenon, therefore, high unemployment should increase the vote for the 11 
 
 
incumbent when that it is PSOE and decrease the vote for the incumbent when it is a party other 
than PSOE (such as UCD in 1982 and PP in the 1999 European elections and the 2000 and 2004 
legislative elections). 
A final possible approach takes into account what several scholars studying economic 
voting in Spain have already detected. Although voters may be retrospective and incumbency-
oriented, unemployment effects on incumbency support could have been neutralized by PSOE’s 
positive stance on welfare policies, along with its ability to maintain protected incomes for the 
unemployed (Maravall and Fraile 2001; Fraile 2005). From this point of view, while we are 
likely  to  see  higher  levels  of  unemployment  electorally  punished  when  PSOE  is  not  the 
incumbent, such punishment would be absent in when the Socialists are in power.  We call this 
third approach the partisan neutralizing of potential negative outcomes. 
Taking these approaches into account, in Table 2 we present estimates from two revised 
models.  Model 2 reads as follows: 
VOTE = B0 +B1European + B2Inflation + B3Unemployment*PSOE incumbent + B4UCD/PP 
incumbent + B5PolSit + u            (2) 
 
Model 2 is different from Model 1 by containing two interaction terms, between the level 
of unemployment and two dummy variables capturing the partisan identity of the incumbent: 
PSOE (left) incumbent and UCD or PP (right) incumbent. On the one hand, if the partisan model 
holds for the case of unemployment, we should expect the former interaction to be negative and 
significant, signaling that the punishment for the incumbent as unemployment increases only 
occurs when PSOE has been in government. (And, we should expect the latter interaction to be 
close to zero, and not significant, since only PSOE is the electoral target).  On the other hand, if 
the Spanish voter is policy-oriented, we should expect PSOE incumbents to be benefited and 12 
 
 
UCD  or  PP  incumbents  to  be  hurt  in  the  electoral  performance  by  higher  levels  of 
unemployment. In other words, the former interaction would be positive and significant, and the 
latter interaction would be negative and significant. 
 
Table 2:  Election Forecast Model of Incumbent Support in Spain,  
  Model 2  Model 3 
European election  -.048**  -.039* 
  (.017)  (.016) 
Inflation (t-6 months)  -.014***  -.013*** 
  (.002)  (.002) 
Unemployment  (t-6months)  * 
PSOE incumbent 
.004  - 
  (.003)  - 
Unemployment  (t-6months)  * 
PP or UCD incumbent 
-.007  -.011*** 
  (.004)  (.001) 
PolSit (t-6 months)  .008***  .008*** 
(*** 
  (.001)  (.001) 
Constant  .307***  .368*** 
  (.050)  (.027)*** 
R2  .96  .95 
Adjusted R2  .93  .93 
SEE  .025  .027 
N  13  13 
Significance: *** .01, ** .05 and * .10; one-tailed test 
Model 2’s results are clearly interesting. In comparison with Model 1, European elections 
maintain their negative sign and size but the precision with which the coefficient is estimated 
clearly increases, with its p-value dropping below .05. The relationship between vote share for 
the  incumbent  and  evaluations  of  the  political  situation  also  becomes  stronger  and  is  more 
precisely estimated, attaining significant at the .01 level.  Importantly, the adjusted R-squared 
increases greatly (from .52 to .93), and the SEE diminishes considerably (from .07 to .025).   13 
 
 
If the partisan model was supported, we should find the interaction between PSOE as 
incumbent  and  unemployment  to  be  negative.  However,  this  is  clearly  not  the  case:  the 
coefficient is positive rather than negative. This calls attention to the policy-oriented model. In 
fact, in Model 2, the signs of the coefficients are as expected for the policy-oriented model 
(positive  for  PSOE  Incumbent*Unemployment  interaction  and  negative  for  the  UCD  or  PP 
Incumbent*Unemployment interaction).  However, each of these interaction coefficients falls 
short of statistical significance, because of a collinearity problem.  Nevertheless, they are jointly 
highly significant (otherwise it would be impossible to observe such an increase in the R2 and in 
the adjusted R2).  
The third approach, that of the partisan neutralizing of negative outcomes, can be tested 
via  a  simplification  of  Model  2.  Instead  of  assuming  that  both  incumbents  are  affected  by 
unemployment, we merely test the hypothesis that PSOE has remained invulnerable to such 
effects. Model 3 thus drops the PSOE Incumbent*Unemployment interaction from Model 2, as 
follows: 
 
VOTE = B0 +B1European + B2Inflation + B3UCD/PP incumbent + B4PolSit + u  (3) 
 
 
The estimates for Model 3 are extremely encouraging. The adjusted R-squared and SEE 
values  remain  virtually  the  same  as  in  Model  2,  despite  dropping  a  variable.  Further,  the 
coefficients of all the variables have the expected signs, and all with p-values below .05; indeed, 
all but one is below .01. The results are clearly supportive of the partisan neutralizing model. In 
sum,  while  collinearity  renders  support  for  the  policy-oriented  model  ambiguous,  the 14 
 
 
neutralization model is both endorsed by previous Spanish research, and is explicitly supported 
by our statistical analysis. Model 3 is, thus, our preferred forecast model. 
 
A Preferred Model: Diagnostics 
 
In  what  concerns  Model  3,  in-sample  diagnostic  tests  show  no  evidence  of 
heteroscedasticity (White test, p-values > .77) or non-normality (Kiefer and Salmon/Jarque-Bera 
tests, p-value = .64). With respect to outliers, they can be diagnosed through examination of 
studentized residuals (Beckman and Trussel 1974).  One observes that only one is statistically 
significant (for the 1996 legislative elections; value = 2.15, significant at .05). The finding of this 
single  significant  residual  is  not  troubling:  with  N  =  13  the  probability  of  having  one  false 
positive out of 13 is almost 50%.  
The issue of the small sample size deserves further attention.  Two main consequences of 
a small N are worth full discussion. The first consequence is larger standard errors, leading to 
lower t-statistics and a failure to reject the null when false. This problem does not appear in 
Model 3, since all the independent variable coefficients are statistically significant. The second 
consequence  concerns  the  high  sensibility  of  the  estimates  to  small  changes  in  the  sample 
composition. First, we examine the condition index test (Belsley, 1991).  The condition index 
bases itself on a simple idea. If the sample size is too small, then   will be a near singular 
matrix. In that case, at least one of the eigenvalues of the matrix   will be close to zero. 
Therefore, close to zero eigenvalues suggest that the small sample size may be a problem. The 




4 (2) computation of the eigenvalues of the standardized  ; (3) calculation 
of the condition index number given by  , where   is the highest (lowest) 
eigenvalue. Based on Monte Carlo simulations, Belsley (1991) finds evidence of severe linear 
dependence between the variables when the index exceeds 30. If the index is between 10 and 30, 
there is evidence of a moderate to severe sample problem. The condition index of Model 3 is 
1.99, a value well below the suggested bounds. 
Despite these encouraging results, it remains the case that inference from such a small 
sample is difficult to rely on. One can still argue that the lack of degrees of freedom may cause 
one observation to have a huge impact on the final results.  Therefore, in order to increase the 
reliability of our results, we perform a more demanding analysis, by examining “out-of-sample” 
forecasts. We exclude each election, one at a time, and re-estimate the model with the remaining 
observations.  Then,  we  check  how  the  model  forecasts  the  omitted  observation.    In  this 
experiment, the largest out-of-sample error is for the 1982 election, with the incumbent vote 
overpredicted  by  15  percentage  points.  But  this  election  was  highly  peculiar,  representing  a 
major  electoral  realignment  in  the Spanish  party  system.    The  incumbent  UCD,  plagued  by 
internal divisions, was deserted by its local notables and lost the leadership of both its founder 
(Adolfo Suárez) and its incumbent Prime Minister (Calvo Sotelo).  It was nearly wiped out as a 
party, garnering less than 7 percent of the vote.  If we restrict our analysis to the other 12 
elections, the model out-of-sample forecasts perform quite well, with a mean absolute out-of-
sample error = 2.8 percentage points.
5   
                                                        
4 This normalization is essential because the test is scale dependent. 
5 This is slightly better than the result of Magalhães and Aguiar-Conraria (2009), who also dealt with a 
comparably small sample in the case of Portugal. 16 
 
 
As a further out-of-sample test, we re-estimated the standard errors of the estimated slope 
coefficients,  by  means  of  Jackknife  (delete-3)  procedures.
6    Jackknife  samples  are  “pseudo-
samples” computed by leaving out three different observations at a time, eventually producing 
286 samples. Then, for each sample Model 3 is re-estimated. From this procedure, an empirical 
distribution for the estimated coefficients is derived. The estimated coefficients prove to be very 
stable, as seen in Table 3. The first column shows the OLS estimates of Model 3 (from Table 2).  
The  second  column  shows  the  average  of  the  Jackknife  estimates.    We  observe  that  the 
respective  coefficient  estimates  are  almost  exactly  equal.      The  third  column  presents  the 
empirical  95%  confidence  interval  around  the  Jackknife  estimates,  confirming  the  statistical 
significance of the average Jackknife estimate. 
 
Table 3. OLS and Jackknife estimates 





95% confidence interval 
European election  -.039  -.037  [-.063,-.013] 
Inflation (t-6 months)  -.013  -.012  [-.016,-.004] 
Unemployment (t-6months) * 
PP or UCD incumbent 
-.011  -.011  [-.013,-.005] 
PolSit (t-6 months)  .008  .008  [.005,.010] 
Constant  .368  .364  [.302,.403] 
 
The 2012 Spanish Legislative Elections: A True Out-of-Sample Forecast 
The next national election in Spain is scheduled for March 2012. An ex ante forecast of 
the incumbent vote share in this election, at this time of writing,  must be a conditional forecast, 
                                                        
6 Delete-1 and delete-2 yield similar results. However, the number of samples is rather small, due to the 
small original sample size. 17 
 
 
based on estimated values for certain independent variables rather than true values. For the 2012 
election, the values of two variables are fixed: UCD or PP Incumbent = 0 (since PSOE is the 
current incumbent); and European = 0 (since the March 2012 election is legislative).  For the 
other two variables, Inflation and PolSit, we need estimates because their actual t-6 values are 
not yet available.  
Spring 2011 forecasts of inflation for Spain, made by international organizations, range 
from 2.6% (IMF World Economic Outlook 2011) to 3% (Eurostat Spring Forecast 2011). Since 
inflation forecasts have been revised upwards in the last months, it seems reasonable to assume 
that inflation a six-month lag to the March 2012 elections will not be much below 3%.  
Popularity measures are likely to be more volatile, so current values are not necessarily 
good predictions of those prevailing around September 2011 (i.e., six months before the election 
month). In the CIS “Barómetro” (April 2011), the percentage of respondents who declare the 
current political situation “good” or “very good” was 3.4%, one of the very lowest scores ever 













Figure 1: Evaluation of the current political situation in Spain (% “Good” + “Very good”) 
 
Note: The dotted line is a 10% bandwidth Kernel smoother 
 
 
In our sample of 13 elections, just the 1996 election has a lower value lower (2.9%). For 
the last two years, the highest level of this variable was 10.4%, in April 2009. Thus, we take 3 
percent as a benchmark for the lowest likely level of government popularity, and ten percent as a 
benchmark for the highest likely level of government popularity, based on the actual time series 
fluctuations over the last two years. We do believe, however, that with the evaluation of the 
current political situation standing at 3.4% in April and with the trend visible in Figure 1, the real 
value in September 2011 should be much closer to the “low” approval benchmark (3%). Table 4 19 
 
 
shows the predicted incumbent vote share for the March 2012 legislative elections under a three 
percent inflation scenario, with the political situation alternatives of the low approval benchmark 
(of three percent) and the high approval benchmark (of ten percent). These conditional forecasts 
are derived from application of Model 3: 
Table 4: Conditional forecasts 
Inflation  Political Situation  Forecast  For. St. Error 
3%  0.353 (35,3%)  0.033   
3%  10%  0.409 (40.9%)  0.031 
 
How do these results look historically for any incumbent Spanish party in general and for 
PSOE in particular? The first scenario, which we deem more likely, with inflation and political 
situation estimates remaining near April 2011 values (respectively, 3% and 3%), spells doom for 
the Socialist incumbents. So far, only twice has an incumbent party received a valid vote share 
below  the  forecasted  35.3%.  (In  the  distant  years  of  1977  and  1979,  the  UCD  gained, 
respectively,  34.4%  and  34.8%  of  the  vote).    Of  course,  this  was  before  the  1982  electoral 
realignment, and the consequent lower level of fragmentation for the Spanish party system that 
followed. Since 1982, the lowest share of the valid votes obtained by a winning party was 38.8%, 
when the PSOE very narrowly defeated the PP in the 1993 legislative election. A Socialist vote 
share  now  of  just  35.3%  would  also  mean  their  fourth  worst  electoral  showing  ever,  only 
exceeding the 1977, 1979 and 2000 elections.  
What  about  our  second  scenario,  with  inflation  remaining  at  3%,  but  the  political 
situation score rising to 10%?   At this level of popularity our prediction takes PSOE’s vote share 
to a more respectable 41%.  However, the Socialists have not attained that level of popularity for 20 
 
 
two years.  Moreover, even if they did, the incumbent vote share that results from that parameter 
would  still  have  been  exceeded  in  four  past  contests  -  1986,  1989,  2000,  2008  (See  the 
Appendix).  In sum, it appears that, given the likely conditions of lagged inflation and popularity 




  The scientific study of Spanish electoral behavior is a vigorous enterprise.  Curiously, 
however, no systematic research has been appeared on Spanish election forecasting.   Here we 
fill that gap.  To begin, we formulate a classic core political economy model, which has well for 
forecasting election outcomes elsewhere.  While empirically supported, this initial model does 
not yield enough accuracy to be of much use as a forecasting tool.  In considering revisions, we 
were guided by competing partisan theories, and peculiar features of the Spanish polity.  On the 
latter,  especially  important  is  the  partisan  neutralization  of  the  adverse  electoral  effects  of 
unemployment, achieved by the Socialist party.   
  The preferred model holds incumbent vote share in Spanish national-wide elections to be 
a function of government popularity, inflation, and unemployment (for the PP only).  This model 
fits the data extremely well and demonstrates considerable robustness, in the face of multiple 
diagnostics.  Of particular interest are the out-of-sample tests, both ex post and ex ante.  The ex 
post  tests  showed  encouraging  experimental  results  with  omitted  observations  and  Jackknife 
samples, especially in terms of model stability. The ex-ante test forecasts the 2012 election, 
which has not occurred at the time of writing.  However, because the model bases itself on an 
ample, six-month lag, we are already able to issue conditional estimates, and soon (September) 21 
 
 
will be able to issue an unconditional estimate of the PSOE vote share.  Clearly, on the basis of 
the  theory  and  empirics  considered  here,  the  future  success  of  election  forecasting  in  Spain 
























Table A1. Election results and variables in the model 
 
 
Sources:  OECD  Main  Economic  Indicators  for  economic  data  and  surveys  from  Centro  de 
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